E. Let promotion to job D carry a wage premium of one dollar. Whether the worker trains then depends on two issues: (i) is a dollar large enough to induce the worker to train, conditional on the worker having a higher chance of promotion to job D if he trains; and (ii) does the worker have a higher chance of promotion if he trains? If the worker can carry out only one task, the firm never pays a premium to a trained worker absent reputational concerns and so the worker does not train. With two jobs the worker's productivity may be higher in job D after training. Then if promoting the worker to job D increases the worker's productivity by more than a dollar, the firm promotes him after training and hence compensates him for collecting skills. A key consideration here is that the worker's productivity must be higher if he is promoted. Hence the firm cannot overcome its incentive to appropriate simply by creating job titles. Separate tasks are required.
In a recent paper Baker, Jensen, and Murphy [1988, p. 593] note the "overwhelming use of promotion based [compensation] schemes" rather than directly compensating employees with pay for performance.1 Baker et al. find this confusing as they believe that sorting workers to tasks should be separated from compensating workers for performance. This paper may help us to understand why this is the case. If firms cannot be trusted to compensate employees for skill collection, then perhaps the only way to induce them to train is by promotion to a different task. Hence, incentive and sorting issues are linked.
I begin in Section I by considering a simple example to illustrate how pay scales and promotion can give rise to efficient training by workers in the presence of two-sided moral hazard. I then consider a more general model to describe the costs and benefits of this type of labor contract. I conclude with a brief discussion of other means of inducing firm-specific skill collection, paying particular attention to the use of tournaments [Carmichael, 1983] and related work on up-or-out contracts by Kahn and Huberman [1988] . Here I make empirical predictions about the kinds of professions where promotion will be used as an alternative 1. For example, Medoff and Abraham [1980] find survey evidence suggesting that between-job earnings differences are more important than within-job earnings differences. Lazear [1991] finds similar evidence from personnel files that most significant wage increases are accompanied by changes in job title. More systematic evidence is given in Groshen [1991] . She finds that for workers in industries not explicitly covered by incentive pay, within-job variance of wages accounts for only about 3-7 percent of the total variance of wages in her sample.
to up-or-out contracts, which seem consistent with empirical evidence.
I. AN EXAMPLE
A risk-neutral worker with reservation utility r is employed in a risk-neutral firm for a single period. His reservation utility must be earned in expected terms during the period. The worker can be assigned either to an easy job, job E, or a difficult job, job D. Before being assigned to a job, the worker can collect specific skills. Let s denote skills, where s = 1 implies that skills have been collected and s = 0 implies that they have not. The worker's utility is U = w -sc, where w is the wage earned. Output or skills cannot be verified to a court or enforcing agency.
Given an efficient but nonverifiable investment opportunity, how can the firm induce the worker to incur the cost of the investment? To clarify the issues, initially consider a one-job model. In a one-job model, the firm will not pay the worker's cost of collecting human capital, absent reputational concerns. (It could promise to reward the worker with a higher wage, but after training, the firm has no incentive to do so in this one-period setting.) Also, having the firm pay the worker in advance will not induce skill collection, as the worker will not invest. Now assume that there are two distinct tasks that the worker can carry out, a difficult task and an easy task. Furthermore, let us assume that the firm can commit to wages as a function of the task carried out. Let yi(s) be the output in job i, i = DE, with training s, s = 0,1. Now assume that This implies that (i) training increases productivity in both jobs, and (ii) a trained worker is efficiently assigned to job D while an untrained worker is efficiently assigned to job E. Thus, the returns to training are higher in job D than in job E. (3) holds, the firm can use promotion to task D as an inducement to train as the extra productivity in job D overcomes the firm's incentive to appropriate. Since the firm can attach wages to the different tasks, the firm can use this as a form of commitment to induce skill collection. In the next section, this insight is generalized to allow more careful consideration of the existence of a contract that induces the worker to train and its efficiency properties.
II. A MODEL
A single worker with reservation utility r is employed in a firm for a single period. He can collect firm-specific skills, where s = 1 denotes that skills are collected and s = 0 implies that they are not. After collecting skills, the worker can be assigned to one of two jobs, an easy job, E or a difficult job D. He cannot be fired, nor can he quit after the contract is signed.2 Output in each job depends on s and the worker's unobservable characteristics, which I denote by aq. -q denotes the worker's ability or match to the firm.3 I assume that -q is uniformly distributed over [0,1] and is unknown to both the employer and the worker before training. Output in job E and output in job D are given byyE(qs) and yD(q ,s), respectively, where output is nondecreasing in each arguments for each job. The technology is commonly known.
I make two assumptions on the technology. First, the difficult job is more suited to those with high ability while the low ability 2. See Section III for a discussion of up-or-out contracts, where the worker can be laid off.
3. Waldman [1984] considers the case where firms infer information on a worker's ability from promotion. Hence wages rise discretely on promotion. This leads to underpromotion as firms must make discretely higher profits upon promotion of the worker to compensate for the higher wage. Introducing this effect into this model does not qualitatively change its results. have a comparative advantage in job E. Second, training is more productive in job D than job E. This is formalized in Assumption 1. The firm is assumed to observe the worker's productivity in each job after training but before assigning him to a position. The firm is risk neutral and maximizes expected profits, output minus wages, while the worker maximizes U = w -cs, where w is the wage paid. I assume that wages cannot be conditioned on the worker's output or on his training decision. However, the firm can specify a wage for each job, with the contract denoted by uf = {WE, WDI.
As in the example above, there are incentive compatibility constraints for both the firm and the worker. First, the worker only trains if the expected return from doing so is at least c. This is the worker's incentive compatibility constraint, [WIC] . Second, the firm only assigns the worker to a better paid job if the profits from doing so exceed the profits from assigning the worker to a poorer paid job. This is the firm's incentive compatibility constraint, [FIC] . Finally, the worker's individual rationality constraint, [WIR], is that he must earn utility of r in expected terms. The firm's objective is to maximize profits subject to these constraints. (1 -*)wD + R*wE r+c. Figure I . The worker's ability must exceed *(f) for the worker to be promoted if he has (not) trained. Hence 1 -*(1 -i) in Figure I refers to the probability of promotion when the worker trains (does not train).6 By Assumption 1(ii), training is more valuable in job D than job E, so that the probability of promotion is higher when the worker trains. However, the probability of promotion falls as the wage raise on 4. Efficiency suggests that all above ability a should be promoted, where YE(oL,l) = YD(aL,l). Since WD > WE, all X9* > 0 which satisfy [FIC] exceed a, and so there is inefficient allocation of workers to jobs. Hence the firm should choose the lowest ar* which satisfy the constraints as this minimizes inefficient allocation of workers to jobs. case where N -a* is small; i.e., where the returns to training are similar in both jobs. Then the required WD -WE is large since the likelihood of promotion does not change much so that the worker must be offered a large wage premium as inducement to train. If the required wage premium exceeds ox in Figure I Thus, the firm cannot simply generate job titles, rather than separate tasks, to induce skill collection.
Results
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Efficiency Properties
The expected profits from a contract where the worker trains are It should be stressed that the firm may not induce the worker to train even in some cases where (a) it is possible to do so, and (ii) the productivity increase for any worker in any given job exceeds c. This is caused if the misallocation effect described above is large enough such that (8) of X. An alternative strategy is not to induce the worker to train by offering WD -WE = 0. This incurs the obvious potential inefficiency that no training occurs: However, at least it reduces the misallocation of workers to jobs, as a fraction p of the workforce is allocated to job D. Hence the misallocation effect may be strong enough for the firm to eschew inducing the worker to train, even if training increases the productivity of all workers by more than c.
To briefly summarize, I have shown that the firm can induce the worker to collect firm-specific human capital in some circumstances by promotion to a different task. This is not the first best solution as there will in general be misallocation of workers to jobs. Two ingredients are necessary for the result. First, the firm must be able to commit to a pay scale, where wages are attached to jobs. Second, the returns to training must be higher in one job than the other. (More than this, it must be known by workers that training improves their promotion chances.) If the return to training is identical in both jobs, training has no effect on promotion prospects and so cannot be used as an incentive device. Note finally that if q refers to the worker's ability, the worker is only rewarded for collecting skills if he is talented (a > a *); the less able are not rewarded for collecting skills. Hence issues of sorting and incentives are linked.
III. CONCLUSION
The classic treatment of human capital is Becker [1964] , who analyzes how workers should be compensated for skill collection when firms can monitor skills and can be trusted to repay workers for collecting these skills. In effect, firms and workers can write contracts on skills collected (though not on quit or layoff decisions). In this paper I have argued that the vague nature of many skills collected by workers makes it difficult to directly compensate them to their collection. Instead, subjective evaluation of workers is necessary. However, "without high trust, there is little chance that the subordinate will believe that his pay is fairly based on performance" [Lawler, 1971, p. 171] . I have shown that a resolution of this problem is that firms may offer promotion to another task as an incentive to collect skills. This is not the only means of encouraging workers to collect nonverifiable specific skills. One possibility is that the firm develops a reputation for honestly repaying workers. But this relies on the firm's discount rate being sufficiently low to make paying workers for the cost of skills collected today worth the future
